Trinity College

Trinity College Digital Repository
Resist Newsletters

Resist Collection

1-31-1985

Resist Newsletter, Jan. 1985
Resist

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/resistnewsletter

Recommended Citation
Resist, "Resist Newsletter, Jan. 1985" (1985). Resist Newsletters. 179.
https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/resistnewsletter/179

Inside: Martin Diskin on the Nicaraguan Elections

Newsletter #172

A call to resist illegitimate authority

January 1985

The Pentagon's Plans for
the Philippines
ERIK GUYOT

The

crumbling hold of the Marcos
Government combined with the
strategic importance ascribed to the
Philippines make this country one of
the major "hot spots" for U.S. policy
makers. Yet, while news of U.S.
military intervention in Central
America and Lebanon fills the
headlines, the Pentagon is quietly laying the groundwork for possible
military intervention in America's
largest ex-colony.
Over the past year there has been a
flurry of activity both in Congress and
the Administration aimed at containing the Philippine crisis. Since last
January, a steady stream of U.S.
military and intelligence officials from
the Philippines have brought back
alarming reports on the rapid growth
of the rural insurgency. This fall,
House Democrats called hearings to
determine how to "pull the rug out"
from under these 10,000-15,000 armed
guerrillas. For the past four months
high-level representatives from the
State Department, the Pentagon,
Treasury, CIA, and other intelligence
agencies have been meeting bi-weekly
to formulate the U.S. response to the
opposition movement in the Philippines.
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Despite this activity, however, U.S.
policy has been marked by considerable flux and turmoil. Different
branches of the Reagan Administration are pulling at Philippine policy in
opposite directions. While the State
Department has pressured President

Marcos to make limited political reforms so as to create political space for
the pro-U.S. elements of the opposition, at the same time the Treasury Department has called for an austerity
program which would further polarize
Continued on page Two

Continued from page One
Philippine society. When Reagan symbolically cancelled a scheduled visit to
the Philippines last fall, it appeared as
though the U.S. was gradually distancing itself from the unpopular regime.
But, then the great communicator torpedoed the State Department's carefully constructed distancing effort during
the presidential debate when he declared that he would not countenance
''throwing them [Marcos] to the
wolves and then facing the communist
power in the Pacific.''
Throughout the bureaucratic infighting over U.S. policy one actor has
consistently had the last word on the
Philippines. Other agencies may quarrell over different ''reform'' programs,
but the Pentagon has held to the bottom line position of protecting its
military bases in the Philippines. This
outlook is evident during Congressional testimony: State Department officials equivocate about "non-interference,'' Pentagon officials are as
blunt as is their program to transform
the Philippine military into an effective
counterinsurgency force. One assistant
Secretary of Defense had no qualms in
referring to $85 million worth of night
vision devices and fire control equipment as ''move, shoot, and communicate items'' which would ''bolster
counterinsurgency capabilities."
U.S. Bases - U.S. Interests
The Pentagon's real estate in the
Philippines - Clark airbase and Subic
naval base - encompass an area of approximately 25,000 acres, about twice
the size of Manhattan. These two bases
are unquestionably the largest and
most important U.S. military bases
overseas. Clark airfield serves as the
headquarters for the 13th Air Force
and boasts the most sophisticated gunnery and air combat practice range in
Asia. Subic Bay, forward operating
port for the U.S. carrier Task Force 77,
is the largest naval supply base in the
Western Pacific and is widely believed
to be the main depot for U.S. nuclear
weapons in the region.
The array of training, intelligence,
storage, and repair facilities at Clark
and Subic, plus the 15,000 military personnel which service them, make the
bases the fulcrum of U.S. military
power in the Pacific. For conventional
warfare capabilities, the bases are
crucial for projecting power to the
Southeast Asian mainland and the
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Middle East. During the Vietnam war,
Clark served as a major airlift and
refueling center for the U.S. airwar.
Currently, any major projection of
force into the Middle East ultimately
depends upon logistical support from
Subic Bay. Sustained military action in
the Middle East by the much heralded
Rapid Deployment Force would rapidly draw down the limited supplies positioned in the Indian Ocean and would
require convoys of the material from
the Philippines. Carrier task forces
from subic are regularly deployed in
the Persian Gulf region during Mideast flare-ups such as: the Iranian
crisis, the Iraq-Iran war, and the North
and South Yemen border war.
Also important are the string of U.S.
ASAT (anti-satellite) tracking stations;
C31 (Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence) facilities; and
Anti-Submarine warfare stations in the
Philippines. These facilities form an integral part of the U.S. monitoring system which enhances U.S. nuclear warfighting capability by allowing selective
"counterforce" targetting of Soviet
missiles and submarines. While removal of these facilities would not hurt
U.S. deterrence capabilities, it would
reduce U.S. first-strike capability. In
addition, the strategic significance of
these bases makes them a magnet for
Soviet attack in the advent of a nuclear
war: SS-20 missiles in Eastern Russia
are targetted at these bases. 1
Although strategic concerns have
been paramount in determining U.S.
policy towards the Philippines,
economic interests are also considerable. Direct U.S. investment in the
Philippines totals more than $1.3
billion and last year's trade with the
Philippines was $4 billion. U.S.
business interests are most apparent in
the so-called "export processing
zones" or reduced tax enclaves • for
foreign textile and semiconductor
sweatshops, and immense U.S. banana
and pineapple plantations. Due to the
expansion of pineapple plantations
such as Dole's 18,000 acre holding, one
of every three cans of pineapples on
supermarket shelves are from the
Philippines.
Finally, the military and economic
importance of the Philippines is increased by its role in providing
"stability" for "America's New Frontier" - the Pacific Rim. Stretching
from Australian and Micronesia up
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through Southeast Asia, China, South
Korea, and Japan this dynamic area is
the fastest growing region of U.S.
trade, having outstripped Europe four
years ago. Due to its location on the
South China Sea, Pentagon officials
point out that the Philippines controls
both the vital sea lanes to mineral rich
Southeast Asia and oil supply routes to
Japan.
Following the assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino Jr. on
August 21, 1983, Washington focused
its attention on the urban unrest sparked by the killing. The assassination
stripped away whatever remaining
legitimacy the Marcos government
had, pushing a large segment of the
middle classes and business classes into
active opposition for the first time.
Soon a loose working coalition between the popular opposition and the
pro-U .S. elite opposition developed. In
response, Washington sought to split
that coalition and isolate the left
through a two-tracked program.
The first track consisted of pressure
on Marcos from the State Department
and Congress to set up an ''independent" commission to investigate the
assassination. Although the stated purpose of the commission was to bring
Aquino's killers to justice, its primary
aim was not justice per se but to diffuse
the increasingly militant assassination
Continued on page Six
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Nicaraguan Elections:
Whose Sham?
MARTIN DISKIN

0

n November 4th, the Nicaraguan
people went to the polls to elect a President, Vice-President, and a ninety-six
member National Assembly. The Reagan administration has professed great
support for elections in certain places,
but not in Nicaragua. United States
support for democracy in Nicaragua is
expressed by its creation, financing and
training of the contras whose constant
attacks on the civilian population have
"neutralized" numerous women,
children, and agricultural workers. The
U.S. has sabotaged diplomatic peace
initiatives, and has engaged in an
economic boycott ostensibly to convince the Nicaraguans to hold an election. When an election was announced,
Washington did its best to prevent it
from occuring. It started a campaign
of villification and other efforts, including bribery, to prevent participation of Nicaraguan parties. Who's
shamming here?
The Nicaraguan election represents
the fulfillment of a promise. Not, according to Kirkpatrick, a promise
made to~ the OAS about creating a
liberal, mildly reformist regime after
overthrowing Somoza in 1979. Rather,
it was the promise made by Daniel
Ortega in a speech to the Nicaraguan
people on August 23, 1980. At that
time he said that elections would occur
within five years. He further stated
that preparations would be begun in
1983. Both promises have been kept.
The election came a bit earlier than
stated, primarily for defensive reasons.
Because of the mounting hostility from
the United States, the Sandinistas may
have felt that scheduling it two days
before the American election might
deter any American aggression because
of the presidential campaign here. Also, it might be a bit harder to invade
Nicaragua after they held a valid election.
The U.S. fostered attack on the
Nicaraguan elections had such little ef-
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Nicaraguan voters await the opening of the polls

f ect that a more insidious and provocative effort was begun. The leaked story
about MIG's arriving in Nicaragua represented the next stage of hostility
against a country that dared hold an
election not approved by Washington.
The Anti-Election Campaign
The efforts to discredit and undermine the election began even before the
February 1984 announcement of the
November date. In December of 1983,
after the first announced intention of
holding elections, a list of nine points,
stated as ''requirements for authentic
elections" was published by a coalition
of opposition groups, the Coordinadora. This coalition included four conservative opposition parties (the Social
Christian party [PSC], The Liberal
Constitutionalist Party [PLC], Social
Democratic Party [PSD], and the
Nicaraguan Conservative Party
[PCN], not legally recognized), the
private sector council (COSEP), two
small trade union federations, the
Catholic Church hierarchy, and the opposition newspaper, La Prensa.
Among the points were demands concerning conditions for campaigning
such as access to the media, abolition
of censorship, and relaxation of
emergency restrictions on freedom of
assembly. These demands were almost
completely met. In addition, however,

Resist Newsletter

the list included points that implied a
thorough overhaul of the political
system as a precondition for participating. They demanded a separation of the FSLN (the Sandinista party)
from the state, particularly with regard
to the Army, the police, television, and
mass organizations such as the CDS' s
(Sandinista Defense Committees).
They also called for a repeal of certain
laws that nationalized private property. Most provocative to the Sandinistas, however, was the demand that
the government negotiate directly
with the leadership of the contras.
The Sandinistas had already declared
an amnesty for the vast majority of
contra fighters but had refused to
negotiate with the contra leadership
that had made no bones about its open
support for the Somoza regime. This
point was immediately and definitely
rejected.
In late July, the Coordinadora
named Arturo Cruz and Adan Fletes as
their candidates for president and vicepresident. Cruz, who has lived outside
of Nicaragua for the last ten years,
served as Nicaragua's ambassador in
Washington for several months, and at
that time was an officer of the InterAmerican Development Bank in Washington. Immediately on arriving in

Continued on page Four
Page Three

Nicaragua
Continued from page Three
Participating Parties and Share of the Vote-1984
Party
FSLN
PCD
PU
PPSC
PC de N
PSN
MAP-ML
Null
Total
Managua on July 22, 1984, he announced that the Coordinadora would
not participate in the election unless
the December 1983 nine points were
agreed to. He further stressed the demand that the contra leaders be induded in a dialogue as a "basic condition." Three days later, on the deadline for registration of parties, after
conversation with the American ambassador, he stated that the coordinadora would boycott the elections.
Cruz's actions convinced many people
that his sole purpose for returning to
Nicaragua was to discredit the electoral
process. Although he was not an official candidate, Cruz traveled through
Nicaragua holding campaign rallies. At
some of these rallies, supporters of the
coordinadora and FSLN youth
clashed.
Still, the coordinadora publicly
demanded a postponement of the election. A round of negotiations began in
Rio de Janeiro at a meeting of the
Socialist International, mediated by
Willy Brandt. Although it appeared
that an agreement was close, negotiations abruptly ended with a government announcement that the elections
would continue as planned without the
coordinadora. In those discussions, the
Sandinistas considered a postponement
of the election to permit the coordinadora to enter the race. By this time
the coordinadora had dropped its demand that the contras be included and
appeared to be offering to mediate a
cease-fire of the contras in return.
However many observers are convinced that the coordinadora had no
intention of participating in the elections since its December 1983 declaration. Further, although Cruz may personally disapprove of the contras, the
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#of votes
(President)
735,967
154,327
105,560
61,199
16,034
14,494
11,352
71,209
1,170,142

OJo of
Valid Votes
67.0
14.0
9.6
5.6
1.5
1.3
1.0

100.0

parties he represented would never
have agreed to support or arrange a
cease fire. Cruz himself called the contras ''our esteemed fellow citizens who
chose the route of war,'' after a onehour meeting with Secretary of State
George Shultz on October 30, five days
before the election.
The Parties
Seven political parties were represented in the election (see box), three to
the right of the Sandinistas and three to
the left. One of them, the Liberal Independent Party (PLI) announced near
the end of the campaign that it was
withdrawing from the election. Its
presidential candidate Virgilio Godoy
stated that free elections were not
possible. Still, the vice-presidential
candidate Constantino Pereira, and
many PLI candidates for the National
Assembly, as well as many regional
party committees, continued to campaign and supported participation. Although the decision to withdraw was a
party decision, the necessary step, that
of submitting a letter of withdrawal to
the Supreme Electoral Commission
(CSE), was not done until after the
ballots were printed and distributed to
the regional polling centers. This
hesitation represented a deep split in
the party and insufficient unanimity to
withdraw. When it still seemed that the
PLI would not run, its vice-presidential
candidate went on television and in the
newspapers to say that he was not withdrawing and continued to seek votes.
He told me that only by participating
could he and his party have any influence on the process. Further, he felt
that withdrawing would only encourage certain elements in the U.S. to
believe they could invade.
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Assembly Seats
61
14
9
6
2

2
2

96
The U.S. Role
United States diplomats were very
active during the campaign. They included Langhorne Motley, Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs, and Harry Schlaudeman,
special envoy for Central America.
Ambassador Harry Bergold and his
political officer, J. Michael Joyce,
freely and frequently expressed the
wish of the United States government
that the opposition parties of the right
refuse to participate as the coordinadora had done. However, this
meddling did not stop with advice. In
an interview with the presidential candidate of the Conservative Democratic
Party (PCD), Dr. Clemente Guido, he
told me that several of his party's
leaders had been offered money by the
U.S. embassy. When I asked him if
these "persuasions," as he called
them, matched the amount of money
each party received from the national
electoral commission, he said that since
it was in dollars, it was much more
than the 9 million cordobas. The U.S.,
on the one hand, created a barrage of
invective toward the Sandinistas, insisting that they hold elections, but also
tried to abort them by dirty tricks. Someone is shamming, indeed!
The Election
Ninety-three percent of the eligible
voters in Nicaragua had registered in a
four-day campaign last July. On Nov.
4th the procedure for voting consisted of
presenting the registration card to
verify eligibility; receiving a ballot,
marking it inside a booth, and
depositing it in a box; dipping one's
finger in red ink; turning in the card;
and leaving. The members of the election board (Junta Receptora de Votos)
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Sandinista Candidate Ortega

were very well trained. Each voter was
given verbal instructions stressing the
maintenance of secrecy and the
freedom to vote for the party of ones
choice. The ballot was completely
secret, sometimes behind a curtain or
in a seperate room. In the eleven polling places I visited during the day,
there were no disturbances. Voters
freely expressed their ideas about the
vote, including some strong opposition
sentiments from people who were not
voting.
Contrasting this election with the
two rounds of voting I witnessed last
March and May in El Salvador, there
was a notably freer atmosphere in
Nicaragua than in El Salvador. None
of the pre-election conflict even vaguely matched the lethal violence that is a
regular feature of politics in El Salvador. In Nicaragua, all parties of the op.position that wished to participate did
so. In El Salvador, opposition groups'
security could not be guaranteed
against death squad activity, even by
the government.
The election campaign was more
focused on issues in Nicaragua. In El
Salvador, it consisted of invective, insult, and threat. The voting public
learned little in the Salvadoran campaign except that hatred separated the
contending parties and candidates. In
El Salvador, in part because each
citizen must prove he or she voted on
request from the police and the army
by showing a stamp on ones ID card,
people went to the polls in large numbers. Once there, their vote was hardly
secret, since the ballot boxes were
transparent and people were usually
milling in the vicinity. Many voters in
the lines in Nicaragua expressed a sentiment I did not hear in El Salvador
when they said that this was the first
free election they had attended.
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Consequences
It was clear from observing this election that it was, as a delegation of the
Latin American Studies Association
stated in their report, "a model of probity and fairness." This seemed to be
the overwhelming view of the numerous observers from Europe and Latin
America. In short, the Reagan administration claim that this was a
"Soviet style sham," although freely
reported in the press, failed to convince
any serious observer. This election
gave a mandate of 63 OJo of the vote to
the FSLN as well as institutionalizing
an opposition with tnore than a third
of the seats in the National Assembly.
Many points of procedure and policy
have already been negotiated between
the FSLN and other parties not only as
a result of the election, but during the
party summit held in October. More
discussions continued during the national dialogue that included over thirty interest groups from all social sectors. The Sandinista social and political project, definitely socialist in
nature, is being defined in a way reflecting the special attributes of that
country. Although under great stress
from the United States, Nicaragua has
succeeded in taking the first step in
building a new social system. For that,
Washington believes it should suffer.
Beginning on election day, stories
leaked from the Pentagon about alleged MIG's appeared to whip up the
American people into a frame of mind
sympathetic to further aggression. The
defeated Democrats, apparently
unwilling to oppose Reagan on the
Central America issue both during and
after the campaign, rushed to outdo
each other in warlike statements. Sen.
Tsongas said that if there were MIGs
in the crates, ''we would have to take
them out."
The U.S. has given lip service to
diplomacy only in order to hide its real
military intentions. When Nicaragua
agreed to sign the Contadora draft
treaty on October 15th, the Reagan administration became the laughing stock
of the international community as it
suddenly discovered that the treaty was
"deficient." When the U.S. loses a
round in this way, it turns ugly.
Nicaragua may now be in greater danger than ever because the U.S. is fast
abandoning the pretense that it favors
a negotiated settlement to the conflict
or that it is willing to reach a political
understanding with the Sandinistas.
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Significantly, various solidarity
groups, and many other concerned
people, have begun mobilizing to prevent a possible escalation of violence
against Nicaragua. Reminiscent of the
pledge to resist illegitimate authority
around which Resist was founded,
there is a new pledge to engage in resistance if there is an escalation in Central America. Congress has proven a
thin reed against administration
manipulation. Perhaps in some new
committee assignments (Senate Intelligence Oversight) the Reagan administration's desire to make war in
Central America can be slowed down.
But the real message that Washington
may heed is that we will not permit
another United States juggernaut to
roll over a poor third world country
trying to liberate itself. By resisting our
government's perverse application of
power, as we did in Vietnam, we might
begin to give voice to the many
Americans who were so poorly
represented in the last election.

Martin Diskin, a professor of anthropology at M.I. T., is a long-time
friend of Resist. He has written extensively about Central America including
his latest book entitled, Trouble in Our
Back Yard: Central America and the
United States in the I 980's. Published

by Pantheon Books, 1984.

Note: For an extensive analysis of the
current situation in Honduras, we encourage Resist readers to contact the
Christie Institute which recently
published a tabloid entitled:

Honduras: A Look at the Reality.
Their address is 1324 North Capitol St.
N.W. Washington, D.C. 20002 (202)
797-8106

HELP WANTED:
RED SUN PRESS, A COLLECTIVELY-RUN, HIGH QUALITY
PRINT SHOP IS LOOKING FOR A
PRESS OPERATOR AND A STRIPPER, WITH AT LEAST TWO
YEARS EXPERIENCE. MUST
HA VE COMMITMENT TO ANTICAPITALIST POLITICS. CALL
RED SUN PRESS, M-F, 9-5:30,
617-524-6822
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Phillipines
Continued from page Two
protests. The commission Marcos
· chose, and especially its chair, retired
justice Corazon Agrava, seemed well
suited for the task. Its extreme reluctance to investigate too closely to Marcos for fear of the resulting political
turmoil was well expressed in Agrava's
bed time prayers: "I'm not asking you
necessarily, Lord, to tell us who pulled
the trigger or who was behind who
pulled the trigger. But please, please,
lead us to a conclusion that will bring
peace and harmony to my Filipino
brothers and sisters.''
The second, and more important
track, was pressure from the State
Department for the elite opposition to
participate in the May 1984 National
Assembly elections. Immediately after
the August assassination virtually
every segment of the opposition had
announced that it would boycott the
upcoming elections rather than grant
the Marcos regime legitimacy since the
National Assembly held no real power
and fair elections were impossible as
long as Marcos ruled by decree.
But after years of claiming that
demands for free elections in the
Philippines would constitute undue intervention, the State Department began pressuring Marcos for some
limited election reforms and launched
an intense lobbying effort to persuade
the elite opposition to participate. As
to whether the election was intended to
result in any real power sharing, State
Department officials predicted that
Marcos would allow the opposition to
win at most 30-40 seats out of 200.
Central to this two-track strategy was
the perception that the U.S. could
distance itself from Marcos and
pressure him to make significant concessions to the elite opposition. 2
Last Spring that strategy seemed to
be working. In February, State Department officials were pleased to note that
the Agrava commission ''has contributed significantly to lowering the
political temperature of the country
over the past months." The unexpected success of the moderate opposition in gaining 60 seats despite massive
fraud seemed to confirm that Marcos
would continue the process of slowly
opening up the political system to the
elite opposition.
Things soon went awry, however.
Public pressure on the Agrava commission forced it to probe closer to Marcos
than intended, yet it was widely
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criticized as a whitewash for not implicating Marcos himself. Marcos' refusal
to share power with the opposition in
the National Assembly and his continued use of decree making powers appeared to vindicate the position of the
boycott movement. By September, the
main political arena was not the National Assembly and its handful of opposition members, but the "parliament
of the streets" and its thousands of
demonstrators.
U.S. Policy at Cross-Purposes
Marcos' s refusal to share power
brought the divergent aims of the
various branches of U.S. policy making bureaucracy more sharply into conflict. The State Department's policy of
opening up the political system a bit
and building the base of the elite opposition rested upon reversing the
political polarization fueled by the
economic crisis. Thus the State Department pushed for the accelerated
disbursement of last year's $50 millitm
in economic assistance to bail out the
Philippine financial system.
Since the State Department views the
Philippine crisis as primarily economic
and political in origin, not military, it
looked favorably upon the plan of
Rep. Stephen Solarz for a massive
economic aid package to the Philippines. This proposal by the influential
chair of the House Asian and Pacific
Affairs sub-committee for a "Shultz
Plan" would pump billions of aid into
the Philippines provided Marcos opened up the economic and political
system to free competition.
In contrast, the Treasury department, more attuned to the interests of
the U.S. financial community, has
prescribed a tough IMF austerity program to insure payment of the Philippines' $30 billion foreign debt. Skeptical of Marcos' intentions to · fully
comply with the IMF program, at one
point Treasury took the almost unprecedented step of vetoing a $150 million
World Bank agriculture loan to the
Philippines. While State lobbied hard
for the sorely needed fertilizer and
pesticide funds, Treasury prevailed and
the U.S. 's symbolic vote against the
loan sent shock waves throughout
Manila.
A clear example of the Treasury
Department's austerity program and
the State Department's process of
political "normalization" working at
cross purposes came last June. Key
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elements of the IMF program that
Treasury backed were a devaluation of
the peso and increasing consumer
taxes. In exchange the IMF would provide the Philippines with a $630 million
bridging loan and its stamp of approval needed to unlock $ .16 billion in
private bank loans. To fulfill the tax
requirement, Marcos secretly filed two
decrees raising taxes which immediately caused an uproar in Manila. Less
than one month after the elections
which supposedly signalled the end to
Marcos' use of decree making powers,
the President had subverted the process
towards "normalcy" to comply with
the pending IMF agreement. A similar
situation occured in October, when
barely 7 days after the IMF agreement
was signed, new gas taxes demanded by
the IMO touched off a massive transit
strike throughout the Philippines.
Meanwhile, Pentagon officials
argued before Congress that although
economic and political reforms were
important, "there is a military element
to the Philippine government's
response which is essential and cannot
be ignored." Thus while Assistant
Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage
praised Chairman Solarz's New York
Times Op-Ed piece on the "Shultz
Plan" as "very helpful" he strenuously objected to Solarz's proposal to shift
some of the $85 million in military aid
to economic aid.
The 98th Congress did change the
figures on the Administration's aid
package of $180 million in combined
economic and military aid by setting
military aid at $40 million and economoc aid at $140 million. That Congress blocked $45 million of the Pentagon's military aid request was due to
a concerted lobbying effort by anti-interventionist and Philippine human
rights groups. For while Solarz was
maneuvering for basically cosmetic
shifts in U.S. aid, he was also fighting
off an amendment by Rep. Tony Hall
of Ohio to cut all military aid to the
Philippines. Despite intense opposition
from Solarz and other congressional
leaders, the Hall amendment had surprising strength garnering 149 votes.
Although this year Pentagon officials received 'only' $40 million in
military aid (roughly two-thirds the
level sent to El Salvador last year), the
prospects for further increases look
good. For one, the mechanics of a $900
million rent agreement for the U.S.
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Phillipines
Continued from page Three
economic injustices and abuse by the
Philippine military are the main source
of NP A popular support. As for arms,
the Pentagon admits that the NP A
receives ''no apparent external support" and that its indigenous nature
''is one of the most troubling aspects
of the insurgency.''
Over the years NP A activity has increased so that it now operates in 53 of
the Philippines' 73 provinces and effectively controls 20% of all Philippine
villages. In the past, the NP A took advantage of the Philippines' rugged terrain and numerous islands by
operating in small, highly mobile units.
Now activity has been stepped up to include larger sized units of up to 100
guerrillas. Some sources predict that
within two years, the NP A will have
achieved rough parity with the Philippine military. Pentagon officials also
warn that if present trends continue,
''the balance of power could favor the
insurgents within the next several
years."
military bases (split 50-50 economic
and military) mean that a decrease in
military aid one year automatically
causes an increase in subsequent years.
Moreover, the bottom line assessment
both in Congress and the Reagan Administration is that since the U.S.
military bases must stay any threat to
the bases must be crushed.
The dispute between Congress and
the Administration is over tactics: representing cold war liberals, Rep.
Solarz believes in primarily economic
and political solutions to "pull the rug
out" from under a growing insurgency; the Pentagon wants a military solution. Thus Congressman Solarz's OpEd piece was indeed "very helpful" to
the Pentagon since it was the first salvo
by the mainstream media in raising the
spector of the New People's Army.
The New People's Army (NPA) is
the fastest growing insurgency in Asia,
if not the world. Numbering approximately 10,000 armed regulars, the
NP A can call upon another 10,000 irregular forces and an estimated
200,000 active supporters. (For comparison, FMLN guerrillas in El
Salvador number some 9-12,000.) Although the NP A is formally the armed
wing of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, most of its members are
drawn from the rural poor and tribal
minorities. Pentagon officials such as
Armitage frankly acknowledge that
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The Pentagon's Counterinsurgency
Program

U.S. policy entered a new phase and
focused on the countryside when
Washington was jolted by alarming
reports on the NPA's growth. In
August, Admiral William Crowe Jr.,
CINCPAC commander of all U.S.
forces in the Pacific, returned from a
fact finding tour of the Philippines.
Crowe, perhaps one of the most influential shapers of U.S. policy for the
Pacific, was reportedly ''very distressed'' with the poor performance of the
Philippine military.
At Admiral Crowe's insistence, a
high-level interagency task force was
established in August to map out a
response to the insurgency. The task
forces' representatives from the State
Department, Pentagon, Treasury, and
intelligence agencies are expected to
soon forward their classified report to
the National Security Council. Some
observers point out that the emergence
of similar interagency groups in the
early 1960s preceded the decision for
massive U.S. intervention in Vietnam.
The type of military aid currently
sent to the Philippines and the U.S. efforts with the Salvadoran military suggest the basic contours of the Pentagon's counterinsurgency program.
As in El Salvador, the Pentagon seeks
to "professionalize" the Philippine
military by removing the so-called
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political generals who are "affected by
bad habits of corruption'' and replacing them with combat seasoned Jr. officers. Thus, last month's removal of
Philippine Chief of Staff Gen. Fabian
Ver, because of his role in the Aquino
assassination, and his replacement by
the West Point-trained Fidel Ramos
was probably well received by the Pentagon.
Until recently, the Philippine
military relied on strategic hamletting
to contain the NPA and the Muslin
seperatist Moro National Liberation
Front, subjecting some 500,000
Filipinos to that process. Now, however, the Philippine military no longer
has the capacity for such troop-intensive programs, but instead conducts
large-scale sweeps. The main components of U.S. aid - aircraft, light
armored vehicles, and amphibious
vehicles - are geared towards providing the mobility and firepower
necessary for these sweeps. U.S.
military analysts are probably watching El Salvador's new air war with 700
man mobile helicopter battalions and
its applicability to the Philippines.
Another aspect of the counterinsurgency program U.S. military officials want the Philippines to implement are ''training programs to
sharpen counterguerrilla warfare
skills." Not long after the U.S. had, in
its words, "relayed our concerns,"
Philippine Defense Minister Juan
Ponce Emile unveiled a new four-point
counterinsurgency plan.
If these new efforts by the Philippine
military fail, the U.S. may seek closer
coordination with its personnel at
Clark and Subic. In the mid-l 970s
Green Berets from Clark engaged in
small scale "civic actions" in guerrilla
areas. Back then, Clark airfield also
provided logistical and air support for
the Philippine military. In addition,
the annual joint U .S.-Philippine
maneuvers have been stepped-up in recent years.
The mere presence of the U.S. bases
in the Philippines would make direct
U.S . military intervention relatively
easy logistically. Direct intervention,
should it occur, would likely begin with
incremental steps, but with the position
of the U.S. bases, it could escalate
rapidly. Given the Reagan Administration's propensity for gunboats over
diplomacy, the temptation for military
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San Diego County Draft Resisters
Defense Fund, PO Box 33544, San

Diego, CA 92103.
In September the Draft Resisters
Defense Fund (DRDF) submitted a
proposal to us on behalf of the Project on Youth and Non-Military Opportunities (YANO). Project YANO
was initiated by a coalition of groups
with a long history of anti-military
activity. Among these groups are San
Diego CARD, San Diego National
Lawyers Guild Chapter, the DRDF
and the San Diego Peace Resource
Center. Because of their anti-military
activities, these groups had encountered difficulties in gaining acceptance for their work in high
schools. The purpose of project
YANO is to increase the effectiveness
of their outreach work in high
schools and to young people. Some
of the goals of project Y ANO are to
challenge the presence of military recruiters and Selective Serive personnel
in high schools; to educate young
people on issues of draft registration,
poverty draft, militarism and the
Solomon amendments; and reduce the
effectiveness of the poverty draft.
Additionally, those at project YANO
hope to promote networking among
community and student groups. Some
strategies for obtaining these goals
are to gain equal access for counter
draft and recruitment materials in
schools, and to institute a campaign
against high school use of Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
Test. Project YANO will use Resist's
grant to produce a brochure on nonmilitary opportunities for youth, including Solomon alternatives.

Great Speckled Bird, PO Box 4532,
Atlanta, GA 30302.
The Bird, Atlanta's progressive
monthly, is back in print and looking
better than ever! The Bird was
originally established in 1968, the impetus for its founding growing out of
mounting opposition to the Vietnam
War and the recognition that the
southern "establishment" press did
not cover subjects that challenged the
local business elite. For seven years
the Bird was the voice for anti-war,
civil rights, feminist, gay and environmental concerns in Atlanta. And
once again, the Bird is pitting itself
against the establishment press and
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the local business community.
Numerous community organizations,
a progressive city council and a
strong civil rights tradition are the ingredients which make it possible for
the Bird to fly again. In the first
several issues - which are published
monthly - the Great Speckled Bird
printed articles on '' Abortion Bigots
Hit Feminist Clinic" (Sep. '84),
"Arab Rights Attacked on West
Bank" (Sep. '84), 'Is El Salvador
Spanish for Viet Nam?" (Aug. '84),
and "Inside the Democratic Convention" (Aug. '84), as well as articles
on numerous, and controversial, local
issues. Resist wishes the Bird many
successful years in print and hope the
headliner which they purchased with
our grant makes their work go a little
smoother.

Federation for Progress, PO Box

2132, Gary, IN 46409.
The Gary chapter of the Federation
for Progress (FFP) and its affiliates:
Calumet Women United Against
Rape, Calumet Unemployed Workers
Center, Gary Welfare Rights
Organization and Women's Action
for Nuclear Disarmament have won
the reputation in Gary of being grassroots fighters and winners as a result
of thir struggles with local utilities,
the welfare department, against home
foreclosures and for their strong
stand for peace and justice. FFP has
called successful demonstrations that
have won the support of local labor
unions, women's groups and others
working for social justice. Resist's
grant helped FFP set up their office
and produce a brochure about their
work.
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Phillipines
Continued from page Seven
intervention will increase as . the
strength of the opposition movement
continues to build.
(Next month, the Philippine opposition)

Erik Guyot is the Co-Director of the
Congressional Liaison Unit of the
Philippine Support Committee. For
more information please write to:
Philippine Support Committee, 1346
Connecticut Ave. NW, Room 533,
Washington, DC 20036.
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1. A comprehensive analysis of the
U.S. bases is provided in "U.S.
Military Bases in the Philippines''
available for $2.50 through Philippine
Support Committee, or Asia Resource
Center, P.O. Box 15275, Washington
D.C., 20003.
2. For a thorough analysis of the
Philippine
elections
see
"U.S.-Sponsored Elections in El
Salvador and the Philippines,''
Walden Bello and Edward S. Herman,
(World Policy Journal, Summer 1984).
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